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Abstract—Top-k queries have attracted interest in many different 
areas like network and system monitoring, information retrieval, 
sensor networks, and so on. Since today many applications issue 
top-k queries on distributed and outsourced databases, 
authentication of top-k query results becomes more important. 
This paper addresses the problem of authenticated top-k 
aggregation queries (e.g. “find the k objects with the highest 
aggregate values”) in a distributed system. We propose a new 
algorithm, called Authenticated Three Phase Uniform Threshold 
(A-TPUT), which provides not only efficient top-k aggregation 
over distributed databases but also authentication on the top-k 
results. We also introduce several enhancements for A-TPUT to 
reduce both the computation cost and the communication cost. 
Finally, we confirm the efficiency of our solutions through an 
extensive experimental evaluation. 
Keywords-component; Top-k, Authentication, Distributed 
Databases, Outsourced Databases 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The results of a top-k query are k objects that have the highest 
overall scores. Top-k queries have attracted much interest in 
many different areas like network and system monitoring [2], 
information retrieval [5], sensor networks [12, 13] and so on. 
The main reason for such interest is that they reduce the 
overhead by pruning away uninteresting answers. 
As network and ubiquitous environments are emerging, the 
objects which are subjects of top-k queries are distributed 
across nodes in the network. This means that the target of top-
k queries is no longer a centralized database but distributed 
multiple databases. In such distributed environments, top-k 
aggregation first aggregates the scores for each object which 
resides in multiple distributed databases, and then, finds k 
objects whose aggregated score (mostly the sum of scores 
from distributed databases) is ranked within top-k. An 
example of top-k aggregation is the top-k query processing 
over a content distribution networks (CDN) for large 
enterprises. Large enterprises have branch offices located 
around the globe. The number of branch offices ranges from a 
few tens to a few thousands. Due to the diverse geographical 
locations of branch offices, the links between the offices may 
have low bandwidth and long round trip time. Successful 
operations of CDN rely on effective monitoring of the 
activities on the network which means that the central 
management station is often asked to answer “top-k” queries 
like “list the top-k most popular documents across the whole 
CDN”. In this example, the score associated with a document 
is the number of downloads for the document. 
The existing top-k aggregation algorithms mainly address 
efficiency issues such as how to find top-k objects with the 
least communication overhead. In the CDN example, if the 
number of documents runs to millions, a naïve method by 
which all data are transmitted to the central manager is 
inefficient. As we discuss in Section II, various algorithms 
have been developed to reduce the network communication 
costs. However, there is one more important issue in 
distributed top-k aggregation: the authentication issue. 
In top-k aggregation, the multiple distributed databases can 
be autonomously managed and sometimes outsourced. Also, 
the data service provider (in short, DSP) which collects data 
from the databases and calculates top-k results can also be an 
independent party and can be outsourced for cost down. In 
such distributed and outsourced environment, the DSP or 
databases may be malicious or subverted by an adversary. 
Even if just one among the DSP and the databases is 
compromised, it could return tampered results, including: 1) 
incomplete results, 2) altered ranking, and 3) spurious results. 
If an attacker drops from the result some higher ranked objects, 
the user receives incomplete information. By tampering with 
the ranking order, the attacker can bias the results. In addition, 
the attacker may add fake information to the result. 
In this paper we investigate algorithms that authenticate top-
k aggregation results in distributed and outsourced databases. 
However, we address not only authentication but also 
efficiency. Our solution is based on a well-known top-k 
aggregation algorithm: the Three Phase Uniform Threshold 
(TPUT) algorithm [2]. We first develop an authenticated top-k 
aggregation algorithm based on TPUT. We call this algorithm 
A-TPUT. The main strength of A-TPUT is that 1) it provides 
the authentication capability which is not supported in the 
original TPUT algorithm and 2) it only requires a fixed 
number of communication rounds between the DSP and the 
databases regardless of the number of objects needed to find 
top-k results. 
To develop an authenticated version of TPUT, we delicately 
integrate two authentication techniques. The first technique is 
the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) which is a tree-based data 
structure for detecting tampering over a series of values. With 
MHT, we can guarantee the completeness and correctness of 
data communicated between trusted parties and untrusted 
parties. The second technique is the Condensed-RSA 
algorithm [14]. Condensed-RSA is a digital signature 
technique which is suitable for combining signatures 
generated by a single signer into a single condensed signature. 
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We use this signature scheme to reduce the communication 
cost between trust parties and untrusted parties. By using 
Condensed-RSA, we can combine signatures of multiple 
objects and send only one digital signature (instead of multiple 
signatures) to reduce the communication cost.  
Next, we develop an optimization technique for A-TPUT 
with regard to the communication between the databases and 
the DSP. Here, we reduce communication costs by increasing 
the threshold which is used to determine how many objects 
should be transmitted from the databases to the DSP. Higher 
threshold means less data transmission. We provide formal 
equations to find a higher threshold value, and then prove that 
A-TPUT always finds the genuine top-k aggregation results 
and correctly authenticates the results with the higher 
threshold value.  
Through extensive experiments, we first show that our 
approach efficiently authenticates top-k aggregation. The 
results show that our approach significantly reduces not only 
communication costs but also response time compared to other 
algorithms.  
Our contributions are summarized as follows: 
• We develop authenticated top-k aggregation algorithms 
(A-TPUT and S-TPUT) using MHT and Condensed-RSA 
for distributed and outsourced databases. We also prove 
that A-TPUT and S-TPUT correctly authenticate the top-k 
results.  
• We propose an optimization technique for A-TPUT and 
S-TPUT. This technique reduces communication costs 
between the databases and the DSP.  
• With extensive experiments, we show the efficiency of 
our authentication algorithms and optimization technique.  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section II 
discusses related work on existing top-k aggregation 
algorithms and authentication for the top-k results. Section III 
presents our system model and attack model, and then briefly 
describes a basic top-k aggregation algorithm (i.e., TPUT) 
which is the basis for our approach. Section IV proposes our 
authenticated top-k aggregation algorithms (A-TPUT and S-
TPUT). Section V presents an optimization technique to 
reduce the amount of data transmission for aggregating top-k 
results. Section VI reports the experimental results. Section 
VII summarizes and concludes the paper.  
II. RELATED WORK 
Work related to our approach falls into two categories: (i) top-
k aggregation algorithms and (ii) authentication for the top-k 
results. 
Top-k aggregation algorithms: Efficient processing of top-k 
queries in distributed environments has received much 
attention [1,2,3,4,9]. A first important algorithm is Fagin’s 
Algorithm (FA) [9] which models the general problem of 
answering top-k aggregation queries using distributed lists of 
data items sorted by their values. It first performs a sorted 
access to all lists and finds at least k data items retrieved in all 
lists. Then, it executes a random access to all the retrieved data 
items to guarantee that the values of the other items are less 
than the top-k values. The Threshold Algorithm (TA) [1] 
improves upon FA by using a threshold so as to stop at a 
higher position than FA. The Best Position Algorithm (BPA) 
[4] improves over TA by reducing the number of sorted 
accesses and random accesses. However a major drawback of 
BPA, as well as FA and TA, is that they require several 
communication rounds which incur very high communication 
costs especially when the number of databases is large. 
   Fagin et al. also suggested the No Random Access (NRA) 
algorithm [1]. It uses a threshold mechanism like TA, but 
unlike TA it does not require random accesses but only sorted 
accesses. Mamoulis et al. proposed the Lattice-based Rank 
Aggregation (LARA) in order to reduce the computational 
cost of NRA [3]. LARA has a computational cost of O(2m) 
where m is the number of databases as opposed to O(n) 
required by NRA. When m is small, LARA is more efficient 
than NRA. But, when m is large, it is not more efficient than 
NRA. 
   The Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) algorithm [2] 
is an efficient algorithm to answer top-k queries in distributed 
systems. The algorithm reduces communication costs by 
pruning away ineligible data items and restricting the number 
of round-trip messages between the DSP and databases. 
However, TPUT does not provide any authentication 
mechanisms. 
Yu et.al. proposed the Three Phase Adaptive Threshold 
algorithm (TPAT), the Three Phase Object Ranking based 
algorithm (TPOR), and the Hybrid-Threshold algorithm (HT) 
[16]. TPAT generalizes TPUT by utilizing summary statistics 
of the data. However, it could be very expensive to use 
summary statistics to accurately estimate data distributions. In 
TPOR, each database should send all data up to the last 
temporary top-k objects in phase 2. Therefore, TPOR performs 
worse than TPUT in the case when object rankings widely 
vary across all nodes. HT is proposed to combine the 
advantages of both TPUT and TPOR. Neumann et.al. 
suggested Adaptive Thresholds [17]. It is similar to TPAT, but 
does not require summary statistics. On the other hand, since 
the problem is NP-hard, it gives approximations based on a 
heuristic. In this paper, we give the exact solution and provide 
better optimization of TPUT than them. 
Authentication for the top-k results: Verifying the 
completeness and authenticity of range and top-k queries 
results computed by untrusted third parties has also received 
much attention. Existing methods [6,7,8,13] for range query 
result verification fall in two categories. The first category 
includes methods that use the Merkle Hash Tree (MHT) [7,8]. 
The method by Li et al. [7] uses the more efficient Embedded 
Merkle B-tree (EMB-tree) structure. Such method indexes the 
data with a B+-tree and then embeds an MHT into it. The 
second category includes methods based on signature-chaining 
schemes [6,13]. Assuming that a database is ordered according 
to an attribute the data owner hashes and signs every triple of 
consecutive data tuples. Li et al. [7] have shown however that 
signature-chaining approaches incur very high index 
construction cost, storage overhead, and user-side verification 
time. 
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   Approaches for the authentication of top-k results have been 
proposed by Nath et al. [11] and Zhang et al. [12]. The former 
approach uses one-way chains and RSA for the authentication 
of the MAX aggregate functions and for top-k queries. The 
latter approach focuses on top-k query results authentication in 
two-tier sensor networks with the goal of reducing the 
communication overhead. However both these approaches 
only handles the situation where all the data items are unique. 
It means that every two nodes have disjoint sets of data items 
and there is no support for aggregation. By contrast, our A-
TPUT allows that different databases have the same objects by 
considering the aggregate value for the object. 
   Pang and Mouratidis have proposed the Threshold with 
Random Access (TRA) algorithm and Threshold with No 
Random Access (TNRA) algorithm for authenticated top-k 
queries [5]. These algorithms are based on TA and NRA, 
respectively. However, since TA and NRA require an 
unpredictable number of rounds, TRA and TNRA are not 
suitable for distributed environments. By contrast, our A-
TPUT algorithm only requires three rounds.  
III. PRELIMINARIES 
In this section, we first introduce our system model and the 
attack model. Then, we briefly discuss an unauthenticated top-
k aggregation algorithm, TPUT, which is basis of our 
approaches.  
A. System Model 
We consider distributed environments for top-k query 
processing and authentication of the top-k results. In such 
distributed environments, our system model involves four 
parties: (i) the multiple data owners who provide data 
collection, (ii) the distributed databases which store a set of 
data, (iii) the data service provider (DSP) which processes top-
k aggregation by communicating with the databases, and (iv) 
the users who issue top-k queries and receive the results from 
the DSP. In our system model, we assume that the databases 
and the DSP are not trusted since they can be outsourced. 
Figure 1 illustrates the four parties and data flows among them.  
The data owners: Data owner DOi manages a data collection 
D comprising n objects: D = {O1,O2,…,On}, n≥1. For example, 
objects can be web pages in a web server, inventory items, or 
people. Each object O is bound to a value V which is the 
measure for deciding top-k results. For example, the value can 
be the number of accesses for each web page, the number of 
inventory items, or the salary of an individual. To compute a 
top-k aggregation, the data owner DOi provides a sorted list Li 
defined as Li = [<O1,V1>,<O2,V2>,…,<On,Vn>] such that: (a) 
∀1 ≤  ≤ , Li.Oj is an object in D and Li.Vj indicates the 
value bound to Oj; and (b) ∀1 ≤  ≤  ≤ , Li.Vj≥Li.Vl. The 
data owner DOi also manages authentication information 
which we will discuss in the next sections. For simplicity, we 
assume that all the data owners have the same data collection 
(but different values may be bound to the same object by 
different data owners). 
The databases: Each data owner transfers its own list and 
authentication information to its associated database for query 
outsourcing. The databases are distributed in the network and 
autonomously managed by different authorities. The databases 
can be compromised or the data stored by database can be 
tampered with. Therefore, we assume that the databases 
cannot be trusted. The role of databases is to provide (parts of) 
the lists and authentication information to the DSP on behalf 
of the data owners.  
The data service provider (DSP): The DSP accepts top-k 
queries from users and returns the results to users. A top-k 
query is forwarded to the databases associated with the 
different data owners and the DSP computes the result based 
on the data obtained from the databases. The query result for 
Q returned to the user, R, is an ordered list of k entries, R = 
[<O1,V1>,<O2,V2>,…,<Ok,Vk>], in which  ∀1 ≤  ≤  , 
R.Oj∈D is a result data item and R.Vj∈ ℝ is its corresponding 
aggregate value. We assume that the DSP also can be 
compromised and the top-k results can be tampered with since 
the DSP can be outsourced.  
 
The users: A user issues a query Q specifying a value for 
parameter k and receives the result R from the DSP. The user 
needs to verify the top-k result R is correct in cases in which 
the databases and the DSP cannot be trusted.  
   A correct query result R should relate to the query Q and the 
data collection D as follows: The aggregate value of an object 
O is V(O)=∑ .   where m is the number of databases in 
the distributed system. The query result R is correct if and only 
if it satisfies the following conditions: 
• The result entries are ordered according to non-increasing 
aggregated values, i.e., ∀1 ≤  ≤  ≤ , R.Vj≥R.Vl. 
• All the objects that are excluded from R have lower 
aggregate values than the last entry in R, i.e., for any non-
result object O ∈D, it holds that V(O) ≤R.Vk. 
 
Figure 1. The System Model for Top-K Aggregation 
B. Attack Model 
As described in Section III.A, among the entities in our system 
model, the DSP and the databases are the potential adversaries 
as they could be subverted by attackers. The attacks can 
happen both in the databases and in the DSP as follows: 
• In the databases, the adversaries may alter the lists. This 
means that values associated with objects may be altered 
or some objects and values may be omitted.  
• In the DSP, the adversaries may execute the top-k 
aggregation query processing algorithm incorrectly or 
tamper with the results. This means that the order (i.e., 
ranking) of the top-k may be changed or some top-k 
results may be omitted. 
 
Example 1: Assume that a top-3 query is given and assume 
that the correct result is [<O1,V1>,<O2,V2>,<O3,V3>] where 
V1>V2>V3. Now assume that a malicious DSP changes V2 to V2’ 
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so thatV1>V3>V2’. In this case, even if the user still gets the 
correct set of top-k objects, the ordering of these objects in the 
result is not correct. In addition, a malicious DSP may drop 
the record <O3,V3> from the result and add a record <O4,V4> 
where V3>V4. In this case, the user gets an incomplete result 
[<O1,V1>,<O2,V2>,<O4,V4>].∎ 
The goal of this paper is to protect top-k results against such 
attacks. To achieve this goal, we will allow the users (i) to 
verify the correctness of the query results and (ii) to check the 
completeness of the results. 
C. The Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) Algorithm 
The Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) algorithm [2] is 
an efficient top-k aggregation algorithm but it does not provide 
any authentication mechanism. We will use TPUT as the basis 
of our authenticated top-k aggregation algorithm since it is 
simple and has desirable features for distributed top-k 
aggregation such as a fixed number of communication rounds 
between the DSP and the databases. 
The Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) algorithm [2] 
consists of three phases, each taking one round of 
communication: 
• Phase 1: it establishes a lower bound on the true bottom. 
The DSP informs all databases that it would like to start 
computing a top-k query. Each database sends the top-k 
objects from its list. After receiving the data from all 
databases, the DSP calculates the partial sums of the 
values of the objects. Then, it looks at the k highest partial 
sums and takes the k-th one as the lower bound, denoted 
as t1 and called “phase 1 bottom”. 
• Phase 2: it prunes away ineligible objects. The DSP sets a 
threshold T = t1/m and sends it to all databases. Each 
database sends back the list of objects whose values are 
greater or equal to T. The DSP then performs two tasks. 
First, it calculates partial sums for the objects. Let’s call 
the k-th highest sum “phase 2 bottom” denoted by t2. 
Clearly, t1≤t2. Then, it tries to prune away more objects by 
calculating the upper bounds of the objects. The objects 
whose upper bounds are less than t2 are eliminated. The 
set of remaining objects is the candidate set S. 
• Phase 3: it identifies the top-k objects. The DSP sends the 
set S to all databases and each database sends back the 
values of the objects in S. The DSP calculates the exact 
sum of the objects in S and selects the top-k objects. 
 
Example 2: Consider the lists in Table I. A top-2 query is 
given. In phase 1, all databases send the data at positions 1 and 
2 to the DSP. The DSP calculates the partial sums: V(O2) = 
0.97, V(O5) = 1.89, V(O6) = 0.89, and V(O0) = 1.59. The two 
highest partial sums are 1.89 and 1.59 and the phase-1 bottom 
t1 is 1.59. Then, the threshold T is set to 1.59/3 = 0.53.  
   In phase 2, database 1 does not send any data since it already 
sent the objects whose values are greater than T in phase 1 and 
databases 2 and 3 send data up to position 4. The DSP 
determines the phase-2 bottom as t2 = 1.59 since V(O5) = 1.89 
and V(O0) = 1.59 are the top-2 sums. Since the upper bounds 
of all objects which are retrieved are greater than 1.59, only 
two objects O1 and O4 which are not retrieved in phase 2 are 
eliminated and S = {O2,O5,O6,O0,O3,O7}.  
   In phase 3, the DSP sends S to all databases. The databases 
respond and the DSP concludes that the top-2 objects are O5 
and O0 and the values are 2.33 and 1.95. Finally, they are 
returned to the user. ∎ 
TABLE I.  AN EXAMPLE DATA SET WITH THREE LISTS 
 
Position List L1 List L2 List L3 
1 <O2,0.97> <O5,0.97> <O5,0.92> 
2 <O6,0.89> <O0,0.80> <O0,0.79> 
3 <O7,0.45> <O3,0.70> <O3,0.72> 
4 <O5,0.44> <O7,0.65> <O7,0.64> 
5 <O0,0.36> <O2,0.52> <O6,0.29> 
6 <O1,0.28> <O4,0.22> <O2,0.28> 
7 <O3,0.19> <O1,0.12> <O1,0.24> 
8 <O4,0.13> <O6,0.01> <O4,0.01> 
IV. AUTHENTICATED TOP-K AGGREGATION 
In this section, we introduce two mechanisms for supporting 
authentication in TPUT. The technical challenges for 
authentication are two folds: (1) to allow users to verify the 
completeness and the correctness of the top-k results and (2) to 
minimize data transmissions between the databases and the 
DSP. For addressing the former issue, we first introduce the 
Skewed Merkle Hash Tree (S-MHT), and then, for addressing 
the latter issue, we develop a mechanism to reduce data 
transmission that uses S-MHT and Condensed-RSA [14] 
together. 
A. Authenticated TPUT (A-TPUT) 
Our algorithm is based on TPUT extended by the use of the 
Skewed Merkle Hash Tree (S-MHT). Merkle Hash Tree is a 
data structure to prove completeness and correctness of a 
series of values by detecting tampering over the values. 
Therefore it is suitable for authenticating top-k query results. 
In the TPUT algorithm, we observe that the entries in the lists 
in the databases are sorted and accessed from the front. This 
means that to calculate top-k results with TPUT, we only need 
a partial list which begins from the first entry of the list. Based 
on this observation, we modify the original MHT structure to 
skew the tree from left to right (i.e., construct the tree structure 
from the first entries to the last entries) as shown in Figure 2.  
   Our S-MHT scheme works as follows. We compute a hash 
chain over the records in the list. We include the digest of each 
record in the digest computation of the record immediately 
ahead of it. Finally, the digest of the first record is signed by 
the private key of the data owner. This signature can be used 
to verify any j leading records of the list. The details are as 
follows. 
   Let n be the number of records in a list Li.  
Digesti,n = h(Oi,n | Vi,n) 
Digesti,j = h(Oi,j | Vi,j | Digesti,j+1), 1 ≤ j ≤ n-1 
Signaturei= Signski(digesti,1) 
   These digests and the signature are computed by each trusted 
data owner and sent to the corresponding database. When a 
database i sends data up to position j, it sends the j-th digest 
and the signature of the data owner as well as the data. When 
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the DSP or the users receives them, they can verify that the 
data sent from the database i was not tampered. 
 
Figure 2. Skewed Merkle Hash Tree 
We now introduce how to use S-MHT to develop A-TPUT. 
A-TPUT has three phases like TPUT. Only the phase 3 is 
modified for authentication.  
• Phase 1: All databases send the top-k objects to the DSP 
and the DSP compute the phase-1 bottom t1 (same to the 
original TPUT). 
• Phase 2: The DSP sends the threshold T = t1/m to all 
databases and the databases send the objects having 
values greater or equal than T. Then, the DSP computes 
the phase-2 bottom t2 and prunes away objects whose 
upper bounds are less than t2. The remaining objects are 
included in set S (same to the original TPUT). 
• Phase 3: The DSP sends S to all databases and each 
database sends the sequence containing the objects 
corresponding to set S. In addition, for authentication, 
each database sends its signature and a digest 
corresponding to the last object which is located in the 
lowest position in the sequence. 
Figure 3 formally illustrates the algorithm for A-TPUT with 
S-MHT. Phase 1 is step 1, phase 2 is from step 2 to 5, and 
phase 3 is from step 6 to 7.  
 
Algorithm A-TPUT with S-MHT 
1. Request the local top-k objects to all databases; 
2. Compute a threshold T=t1/m where t1 is phase-1 bottom; 
3. Request objects whose values ≥ T to all databases; 
4. Compute phase-2 bottom t2; 
5. Prune objects whose upper bounds are less than t2; 
6. Request each sequence containing remaining objects, a digest, and a 
signature from each database; 
7. Report each sequence, each digest, and each signature for each database 
to the user; 
Figure 3. A-TPUT (with S-MHT) algorithm 
Example 3: To illustrate the algorithm, consider the lists in 
Table 1. The first two phases of A-TPUT are the same as in 
TPUT. However, in phase 3, since S ={O2,O5,O6,O0,O3,O7}, 
the database 1 should send a sequence containing objects up to 
position 7, Digest1,7, and the signature. The database 2 has to 
send a sequence containing objects up to position 8, Digest2,8, 
and the signature. Finally the database 3 should transmit a 
sequence containing objects up to position 6, Digest3,6, and the 
signature. When the DSP receives the sequences from the 
databases, it forwards them to the user that can then verify the 
top-k result.∎ 
   The following theorem establishes the correctness of 
algorithm A-TPUT with S-MHT (i.e., the algorithm 
authenticates top-k results.) 
Theorem 1. A-TPUT correctly authenticates the top-k objects. 
Proof (sketch). We prove the theorem?for all integer x∈[1,n]: x 
is determined as the threshold and the remaining objects in 
phase 3. If the user accepts a sequence from the database i in 
A-TPUT, then conditioned upon the top-(x-1) values being 
correct, Vx must be the value of the object Ox with the x-th 
largest value. Trivially top-1 value is proved to be correct by 
Digesti,1 and Signaturei. Obviously, the theorem can be 
trivially proved via an induction on x. 
   Let the object with the x-th largest value be object Ox and let 
its value be Vx. Let Ox’ and Vx’ be the corresponding answers 
returned by the DSP. They may be forged. We prove by 
contradiction. Assume that Vx’≠Vx. The user must successfully 
verify Digestx’ for Vx’. But, when the user checks whether 
Verifypk(Digest1’,Signature) = 1, since Digest1’= 
h(…h(Ox’|Vx’| Digestx+1)) is different from Digest1, the 
verification fails. 
   On the other hand, an adversary may drop an object at the 
bottom of the sequence. The smallest value in the sequence 
should be less or equal to the local top-k value and the 
threshold by the definition of A-TPUT. In addition, the 
sequence should contain the top-k objects and the upper 
bounds of all remaining objects should be greater or equal to 
the smallest top-k value. When the adversary drops an object, 
these conditions may not be satisfied. If these conditions are 
not satisfied, it means that the result was forged or an object 
was dropped.∎ 
   Compared to the existing authenticated top-k aggregation 
algorithms in outsourced databases, TRA and TNRA [5], in 
our algorithm, the databases may send more data than TNRA. 
However the response time of A-TPUT is much less than TRA 
and TNRA since our algorithm has the strength on the fixed 
number of data communication rounds in distributed 
environments. TRA and TNRA are based on TA and NRA [1] 
and the latency of TRA and TNRA is unpredictable because 
the number of rounds varies by data input. The response time 
consists of several round trip times. Each round trip time 
contains transmission time, propagation delay, and 
computation time at the DSP. In distributed environments, the 
propagation delay is usually much longer than the 
transmission time. For example, when the distance is 1000km, 
the bandwidth is 100Mbps, and we send a packet of size 
100Bytes, then, the propagation delay is about 4ms and the 
transmission time is 0.008ms. Even if databases send k records 
every round as TPUT, the propagation delay is much longer 
than the transmission time. Moreover, TA and NRA has much 
more rounds than TPUT. As the number of rounds increases, 
the response time increases. So, for distributed databases, 
TRA and TNRA are not desirable. We will show the 
advantage of our algorithm in the experimental section. 
B. Signature-based TPUT (S-TPUT) 
One weak point of A-TPUT is the number of data entries 
which have to be transmitted from databases to DSP. This 
number depends on the threshold T in phase 2 and the set of 
remaining data S in phase 3. Here, we focus on the set S of 
phase 3. We will focus on T in Section V. 
We note that in A-TPUT the amount of data transmission 
does not depend on the number of objects in S but depends on 
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the lowest rank in S. In our basic S-MHT based algorithm, 
even though the number of remaining objects in S is small, if 
the rank of an object in S is low, the databases should send a 
lot of data to the DSP. This is because we should send the 
partial list which begins from the first entry to the entry which 
has the lowest rank in S to authenticate the results (especially, 
completeness). This means that we cannot omit any entry 
between the first entry and the least ranked entry. 
So, in this subsection, we exploit a signature-based 
technique to address this problem (i.e., allowing us to omit 
useless entries in the list). In our approach, data owners 
additionally sign each tuple using Condensed-RSA [14]. The 
Condensed-RSA scheme is a simple extension of the standard 
RSA scheme. One of the well-known features of RSA is its 
multiplicative homomorphic property. This property makes 
RSA suitable for combining signatures generated on each data 
item in a set by a single signer into a single condensed 
signature. Having successfully verified a condensed signature, 
a user can be assured that each data covered by the condensed 
signature was signed by the data owner. 
Standard-RSA: A data owner has a public key pk = (n’, e) 
and a secret key sk = (d), where n’ is a k’-bit modulus 
computed as the product of two random k’/2-bit primes p and 
q. The respective public and secret exponents  ,   ? ∗  
satisfy  ? 1 mod ∅(′) where ∅(′) = ( − 1)( − 1). An 
RSA signature is computed over the hash of the input message.  
Let ℎ() denote a suitable cryptographic hash function such 
as MD5 or SHA-1 which produces a fixed-length output h(*) 
upon a variable-length input m’. A standard RSA signature on 
message m* is computed as:  = ℎ(∗) (mod ?) . RSA 
signature verification involves checking that ! ≡
ℎ(∗) # ′. 
Condensed-RSA: Given j input messages {m1,…,mj} and 
their corresponding signatures {s1,…,sj}, a Condensed-RSA 
signature is given by the product of the individual signatures: 




    The resulting signature s1,j has the same size as a standard 
RSA signature. When verifying a condensed signature, the 
verifier needs to multiply the hashes of all input data and 
check that: 




   Now we will explain S-TPUT algorithm. In phase 3, when 
the DSP requests data corresponding to remaining objects, 
each database computes a Condensed-RSA signature from the 
signatures of data corresponding to the remaining objects. 
Then, each database sends the data, the digest corresponding 
to the last object in phase 2, the signature of S-MHT and the 
Condensed-RSA signature to the DSP. 
    So, when a user receives the data, the digest, the signature 
of S-MHT and the Condensed-RSA signature for each 
database, it knows which objects are remaining objects whose 
upper bounds are greater than the smallest top-k value. Then, 
by using the Condensed-RSA signature the user can verify 
whether the data corresponding to remaining objects are 
forged or dropped. 
Figure 4 shows the S-TPUT algorithm. Compared to 
algorithm in Figure 3,   Steps 1 to 5 are same but the 
remaining parts include the use of Condensed-RSA.  In step 6, 
we can see that it requests a set of only data corresponding to 
remaining objects instead of a sequence containing remaining 
objects. 
By using S-TPUT, we can reduce the communication 
overhead between databases and DSP. But, since each record 
need a signature, the databases have more storage overhead. 
However, we assume that since there are big storages 
nowadays, the storage overhead is not a significant problem. 
In addition, since S-TPUT exploits the Condensed-RSA 
signature, the databases have more computation overhead than 
A-TPUT. But, the computation times overlap with disk I/O 
time at the databases, and S-TPUT needs only a small number 
of signatures of records when compared to all records to be 
sent. So, S-TPUT has much less computation time than ASB-
tree which needs the signatures for all records [7]. In [7], one 
I/O operation time for random access is 15ms and the cost of 
one modular multiplication with 128Byte modulus for the 
Condensed-RSA signature is 100?s.  
Algorithm S-TPUT 
1. Request the local top-k objects to all databases; 
2. Compute a threshold T=t1/m where t1 is phase 1 bottom; 
3. Request objects whose values ≥ T to all databases; 
4. Compute phase 2 bottom t2; 
5. Prune objects whose upper bounds are less than t2; 
6. Request data corresponding to the remaining objects; 
7. Each database compute its Condensed-RSA signature from the 
signatures corresponding to the remaining objects 
8. Report the data, each digest, each signature of S-MHT, and each 
Condensed-RSA signature for each database to the user; 
Figure 4. S-TPUT algorithm 
Example 4: In phase 3 of A-TPUT, since S = 
{O2,O5,O6,O0,O3,O7}, the database 1 should send data up to 
position 7, Digest1,7, and the signature of S-MHT. The 
database 2 has to send data up to position 8, Digest2,8, and the 
signature of S-MHT. Finally the database 3 should transmit 
data up to position 6, Digest3,6, and the signature of S-MHT. 
However, in phase 3 of S-TPUT, the database 1 does not 
need to send <O1,0.28> since O1 is not in S. Instead, it 
computes a Condensed-RSA signature CS1 = SO7 ∙ SO5∙ SO0∙ SO3 
and sends O7, O5, O0, and O3 with the aggregate signature CS1, 
the digest, and the signature of S-MHT. The database 2 does 
not need to send O4 and O1. It sends O2 and O6 with its 
Condensed-RSA signature CS2. The database 3 sends O6 and 
O2 with its Condensed-RSA signature CS3. So, S-TPUT sends 
3 records less than A-TPUT in this example. Finally, when the 
user receives the data and the Condensed-RSA signatures, it 
multiplies the hashes of the data from each database 
corresponding to the remaining objects and it checks whether 
the product is equal to each Condensed-RSA signature.∎ 
Theorem 2. S-TPUT  correctly authenticates the top-k objects. 
Proof (sketch). By Theorem 1, a sequence in phase 2 satisfies 
correctness and the completeness since each database should 
send data whose values are greater or equal to the threshold. 
Suppose that there are x remaining objects in phase 3. An 
adversary succeeds in breaking Condensed-RSA if it produces 
a valid aggregated signature for the remaining objects which 
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passes verification. There are two cases. First, the adversary 
can forge the value of an object. Second, it can drop an object.  
   First, suppose that the adversary changes the value Vx to Vx’ 
for the object Ox. However, since it does not know the data 
owner’s private key, it cannot generate valid individual 
signature Sx’ for the forged value Vx’. Hence, it cannot 
generate valid Condensed-RSA signature to pass the 
verification. Thus,($,')! ≠ ∏ ℎ(&|&′) (mod )'& . Second, 
the adversary may drop an object. In that case, by Theorem 1, 
the user knows which objects are remaining objects in phase 3. 
So, if the adversary drops an object, it is detected by the user. 
Therefore, S-TPUT correctly authenticates the top-k objects.∎ 
V. OPTIMIZATION 
In this section, we present an optimization technique for A-
TPUT and S-TPUT. Optimization can be done between the 
databases and the DSP. We focus on minimizing the amount 
of data transmission.  
A. Optimization between Databases and DSP 
Even though A-TPUT and S-TPUT are efficient algorithms in 
that it reduces the communication cost by pruning away 
ineligible data items, it can be inefficient especially in the case 
where the threshold T is too small. In A-TPUT and S-TPUT, 
the threshold is set to T = t1/m where t1 is the phase 1 bottom 
and m is the number of databases. If T is small, the databases 
should send large parts of their data to the DSP. This results in 
a large amount of data transmissions between databases and 
DSP which makes A-TPUT and S-TPUT inefficient.  
In this section, we introduce an approach, called Improved 
TPUT (I-TPUT), to decrease the communication overhead of 
A-TPUT and S-TPUT by increasing the threshold T. We 
observe that data about an object are not sent from all 
databases in phase 1. This means that the local top-k objects 
are usually not exactly same in all databases.  We can use this 
observation to replace t1 by t1’ which is greater than t1. 
Consequently, we can use T’ = t1’/m instead of T. This 
increases the threshold in phase 1 since T’ > T and then 
decreases communication cost between databases and DSPs. 
We calculate T’ as follows. When the DSP receives the top-
k objects from the databases, it computes the global objects 
and their aggregate values. In addition, for the object having 
the k-th largest value, it counts how many databases have sent 
the object. The counter for object Ok is denoted by Ck. For 
instance, when Ck is equal to j (1?j?m), it means that the 
object Ok was received from j databases and (m – j) databases 
did not send the object Ok in phase 1.  
First, we assume that the values of the object Ok in the 
unreported databases are greater than or equal to T and make a 
new threshold as follows according to the assumption:  
 
- = (/ + ( − 23) ∗ -)/ 
 
If the data values among databases are correlated 1 , the 
assumption is true with high probability. For the case where 
                                                        
1  This kind of data correlation is common in real-world 
applications[10]. 
the assumption is not true, we will recalculate T’ later in I-
TPUT algorithm. 
Next, the DSP requests the databases to send data whose 
values are greater than or equal to T’. When the DSP receives 
data whose values are greater than or equal to T’ in phase 2, it 
should check that the k-th largest value is greater than or equal 
to m*T’ to see whether the assumption we used to calculate T’ 
is true or not: 
1) If the k-th largest value is greater than or equal to m*T’, it 
means that the assumption is true (i.e., the objects which are 
not reported so far do not have values greater or equal to 
m*T’). Therefore, we can safely use T’ ( < T) as the threshold 
and do not need to receive additional data from databases. 
2) On the other hand, if the k-th largest value is less than 
m*T’, it means that the assumption is false and we need to set 
a new threshold value T* = t2/m. Since t2 is the k-th largest 
value in phase 2, it is greater than or equal to t1. Therefore, T ≤ 
T* ≤ T’ and this means that the threshold is still greater than or 
equal to the original TPUT. Now, the DSP requests the 
databases to send additional data whose values are greater than 
T*.  
Figure 5 shows the I-PUT algorithm in detail. 
 
Algorithm I-TPUT 
1. Request the local top-k objects to all databases; 
2. Compute a threshold T’=(t1+(m-Ck)*T)/m where t1 is phase 1 bottom; 
3. Request objects whose values ≥ T’ to all databases; 
4. Compute phase 2 bottom t2; 
5. Check whether the smallest top-k value is greater than or equal to m*T’; 
6. If so, go to the step 9; 
7. Otherwise, Request objects whose values ≥ T* (=t2/m) to all databases; 
8. Compute phase 2 bottom t2; 
9. Prune objects whose upper bounds are less than t2; 
10. Request data corresponding to the remaining objects; 
Figure 5. I-TPUT algorithm 
Example 6: Suppose that there are three databases and top-1 
query is given. If (O1, 0.6), (O1, 0.6), (O2, 0.7) are received 
from three databases in phase 1, then, T = (0.6+0.6)/3 = 0.4. 
But, in I-TPUT, T’ = (1.2 + (3-2)*0.4)/3 = 0.53. So, by using T’ 
instead of T, we can reduce the communication overhead. In 
phase 2, when the DSP receives data whose values are greater 
than or equal to 0.53, it should check whether the smallest top-
k value is greater or equal to 1.59(=0.53*3). If so, the 
algorithm can terminate. Otherwise, the DSP should receive 
data whose values are greater or equal to T* like the original 
TPUT. ∎ 
Performance Analysis of I-TPUT. By using a threshold T’ 
greater than T, I-TPUT reduces the communication overhead 
corresponding to part A in Figure 6. Since I-TPUT has higher 
threshold than A-TPUT, it sends less data than A-TPUT. The 
data which is not needed to be sent is shown part A. However, 
since I-TPUT may have more remaining objects than A-TPUT 
in phase 3, it may result in a higher communication overhead 
corresponding part B. If I-TPUT has more remaining objects 
than A-TPUT, its lowest position of the remaining objects is 
lower than A-TPUT. But, usually part A is much greater than 
part B. So, I-TPUT has much less communication overhead 
than A-TPUT.  
   The communication overhead of A-TPUT is  ∗  ∗
(1.0 − -) + ∑  ∗ 6 ∗ (- − 76)6  where LOi is the smallest 
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value for the remaining objects in list Li and pi is the 
probability that LOi is less than T in  list Li. The 
communication overhead of I-TPUT is  ∗  ∗ (1.0 − -′) +
∑  ∗ 6 ∗ (-′ − 76)6 . Thus, the difference between A-
TPUT and I-TPUT is  ∗  ∗ (- − -) + ∑  ∗ 6 ∗ (- −676) − ∑  ∗ 6 ∗ (-′ − 76)6 . In correlated databases which 
have similar sets of top-k objects, usually p and p’ are equal to 
0. Thus, the difference is  ∗  ∗ (- − -)  where T’>T. 
Therefore, I-TPUT has much less communication overhead 
than the original A-TPUT. 
 
 
Figure 6. Performance Comparison of A-TPUT and I-TPUT 
We note that I-TPUT can be used in S-TPUT as well as A-
TPUT since I-TPUT is only involved in phase 1. 
VI. EXPERIMENTS 
A. Setup 
We implemented the following algorithms in : A-TPUT, S-
TPUT, AI-TPUT, and SI-TPUT. To better assess our 
algorithms we also implemented two existing algorithms:  
• Naïve: The databases send all data to the DSP and the 
DSP forwards to the user all data received from the 
databases.  
• TNRA: NRA based authenticated top-k aggregation 
algorithm proposed in [5]. TRA also provides 
authentication for top-k aggregation, but we compare our 
algorithms to only TNRA since [5] shows that TRA has 
worse performance than TNRA.  
   We tested them over correlated synthetic data sets.  
 Correlated sets are data sets in which the values of the data 
in the lists are correlated. In real-world applications, such 
correlations are common [10]. In our experiments, we generate 
two sets of correlated data. Inspired from [10,4], we use a 
correlation parameter α (0≤α≤1). We use two kinds of 
synthetics as follows:  
• Zipf law (CZ-Data): The first set of correlated databases 
was generated as follows. For the first list, we randomly 
select the position of data items. Let p1 be the position of 
a data item in the first list, then for each list Li (2≤i≤m) we 
generate a random number r in the interval [1 .. n*α] 
where n is the number of data items, and we insert the 
data item in the list at a position p such that its distance 
from p1 is r. If p is occupied previously by another data 
item, we insert the data item at the free position closest to 
p. After setting the positions of all data items in all lists, 
we generate the values of the data items in each list in 
such a way that they follow the Zipf law. The Zipf law 
states that the value of an item in a ranked list is inversely 
proportional to its rank (position). Such distribution is 
commonly observed in many kinds of phenomena, e.g. the 
frequency of words in a corpus of natural language 
utterances. 
• Uniform distribution (CU-Data): The second set of 
correlated databases was generated as follows. For the 
first list, we randomly generate a number for an object Oj. 
The values follow the uniform distribution. Let p1,j be the 
number. Then for each list Li (2≤i≤m) we generate a 
random number r in interval [-α,… ,α] and we set pi,j to 
p1,j +r. By controlling the value of α, we create databases 
with stronger or weaker correlations. 
Our default settings for different experimental parameters are 
shown in Table II. In our tests, the number of databases, i,e, m, 
is a varying parameter. The default number of databases is 128. 
The default number of data items in each database is 10,000. 
Typically, users are interested in a small number of top 
answers, thus unless specified we set k=100. Like many 
previous approaches to top-k query processing [2], we use a 
scoring function that computes the sum of the local values. In 
addition, the default number of correlation parameter ? is 
0.01. 
TABLE II.  EXPERIMENTAL PARAMETERS 
Parameter Values 
# of databases (m) 
# of records (n) 
k in top-k 





To evaluate the performance of the algorithms, we measure 
the following metrics: communication overhead between 
databases and DSP, and response time taken to get the 
authenticated top-k results from the databases. Concerning the 
communication overhead it is important to notice that even 
though the number of remaining objects at phase 3 is small, if 
the position of the last top-k object is low, in A-TPUT 
databases would typically send a lot of data to the DSP. By 
measuring the number of records transmitted by A-TPUT and 
S-TPUT, we can verify that S-TPUT is more efficient than A-
TPUT.  
On the other hand, when the threshold is very small in A-
TPUT or S-TPUT, each database should send a lot of data to 
the DSP. By measuring the communication overhead of AI-
TPUT and SI-TPUT, we can verify that AI-TPUT and SI-
TPUT are more efficient than A-TPUT and S-TPUT. AI-
TPUT and SI-TPUT uses I-TPUT technique of section V.A. 
 Response time is a time that an algorithm executes for 
finding the top-k data items. TNRA requires several rounds. 
By contrast our algorithms only require three rounds. In 
distributed environments, a round trip time is much longer 
than a transmission time. So, TNRA has much longer response 
time than ours. We compare our algorithm to only TNRA 
since TRA has much larger communication overhead than 
TNRA [5]. 
For the experiments in Sections VI.B – VI.D, we use the 
synthetic data sets for the experiments since we can fine tune 
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characteristics of data. We omit the experiment for real data 
due to space constraint. 
B. Communication Cost of S-TPUT 
In this experiment, we compare the communication overhead 
of our algorithms with that of naïve approach to show the 
effect of the S-TPUT and the I-TPUT optimization (i.e., higher 
threshold values). In this subsection, we evaluate the 
efficiency of S-TPUT, whereas in next subsection we evaluate 
that of I-TPUT. The communication cost metric is the number 
of records transmitted from the databases to the DSP. The 
result with CZ-Data is shown in Figure 7 and the result with 
CU-Data is shown in Figure 8. From the results, we can see 
that the efficiency of our proposed algorithm is largely 
depends on the data distribution but our algorithm overwhelms 
the existing algorithms in most cases. 
In Figure 7 we can see that with CZ-data, S-TPUT incurs 
about 100 times less communication overhead than A-TPUT. 
This is due to that, in phase-3, S-TPUT receives only the data 
corresponding to the set S of the remaining objects instead of 
the sequences containing all of the objects in S as with A-
TPUT. When the number of remaining objects S in phase 3 
becomes small, the advantage of S-TPUT becomes large. In 
addition, when the position of the last objects becomes low, 
the communication cost of A-TPUT becomes large.  
The experiments in Figure 8 show that, unlike with CZ-Data, 
S-TPUT has a similar communication overhead with CU-Data 
compared to A-TPUT. With CZ-Data, S-TPUT has a small 
number of remaining objects in phase 3 compared to A-TPUT. 
But, with CU-Data, S-TPUT has a small threshold and there 
are a lot of data, whose values are greater than the threshold, 
to be sent in phase 2. On the other hand, with CZ-Data, even if 
S-TPUT has a small threshold, there are no a lot of data whose 
values are greater than the threshold in phase 2 since the 
values follow the Zipf law. 
For example, let’s assume that the threshold is 0.1. Since 
the values are between 0 and 1, with CZ-Data, a database 
sends only 10 records in phase 2 to DSP since the values 
follow the Zipf law. But, with CU-Data, the database should 
send about 90% of records since the values follow uniform 
distribution. Therefore, S-TPUT is efficient with CZ-Data, but 
it is not with CU-Data. 
C. Communication Cost of I-TPUT 
From the experiments in Figure 7, we can see that I-TPUT is 
not much efficient for CZ-data. This is due to that, in the Zipf 
law, the value of an item in a ranked list is inversely 
proportional to its rank. Since the value is between 0 and 1, the 
value in the first rank is 1, the value in the second rank is 0.5, 
and the value in the j-th rank is 1/j. So, for example, when 
k=100, a database sends records whose values are greater than 
0.01 in phase 1 by the Zipf law since it sends local top-100 
records in phase 1. If the threshold of S-TPUT is greater than 
0.01, SI-TPUT is not much efficient since even if SI-TPUT 
has a higher threshold than S-TPUT, it already sent records 
whose values are greater than 0.01 in phase 1. 
In contrast, in Figure 8, with CU-Data, we can see that I-
TPUT is much efficient compared to A-TPUT and S-TPUT.  
AI-TPUT and SI-TPUT incur about 40% less communication 
overhead than A-TPUT and S-TPUT. This is due to the fact 
that when the threshold is small in A-TPUT or S-TPUT, the 
databases have to send a lot of data to the DSP since the 
values are uniformly distributed. But, in AI-TPUT or SI-TPUT, 
by increasing the threshold using our I-TPUT algorithm, we 
can reduce the communication overhead compared to A-TPUT 
and S-TPUT. 
The results in Figure 8(c) show that, when k is 25, A-TPUT 
and S-TPUT have more communication overhead than the 
other cases in which k is greater than 25. When the values are 
uniformly distributed, if k is too small, we cannot find the 
proper threshold. As k increases, we can get the better 
threshold.  
D. Comparing S-TPUT with TNRA 
In this experiment, we compare our S-TPUT with the existing 
authenticated top-k aggregation algorithm, TNRA [5]. We 
measure the response time for the DSP to receive all data for 
top-k from databases. As we described in Section V, counting 
the number of transmitted records is not feasible to compare 
the response time since TNRA has unpredictable number of 
round trips and the round trip rime is much longer than the 
transmission time. But our approach only requires a fixed 
number of rounds. This feature significantly reduced actual 
response time since in distributed environments the round trip 
time is much higher than the packet transmission time. The 
round trip time is proportional to the distance between a 
database and a DSP. We assume that the round trip time is 
10ms and the processing time is trivial. For TNRA, the 
database sends k (=100) records every round. 
In Figures 9, we can see that, in all experimental instances, 
S-TPUT has a constant response time, whereas TNRA has a 
response time much greater than S-TPUT. As the parameters 
like the number of databases, k in top-k, the number of records, 
and correlation ratio α increase in TNRA, the response time 
increases. The results show that S-TPUT is the most suitable 
algorithm for a distributed environment. Thus, S-TPUT has 
much lower response time than TNRA. 
VII. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we present the work for authenticated top-k 
aggregation in distributed and outsourced databases. Our aim 
is to enable the users to detect whether the top-k results 
contain the correct results and to give efficient algorithms to 
compute the top-k results with less communication overhead 
and lower response time. Our algorithms are based on the 
Three Phase Uniform Threshold (TPUT) algorithm which 
gives top-k but does not have an authentication mechanism. To 
the best of our knowledge, ours is the first authentication 
mechanism based on TPUT which is efficient in distributed 
environments. First, we propose A-TPUT having 
authentication mechanism based on TPUT. Second, we 
suggest S-TPUT and I-TPUT to improve A-TPUT. In addition, 
we experimentally evaluate our techniques and demonstrate 
their robustness and practicality. 
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Figure 7. Correlated Data following the Zipf law 
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Figure 8. Correlated Data following Uniform distribution 
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Figure 9. TNRA vs S-TPUT 
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